‘A reset of capitalism, not a climate transition,’ warns scientist Marcela Vecchione about the carbon market at COP30

According to the expert on the subject, offsetting emissions between countries “does not transform the productive system — neither the energy system, nor the agri-food system, nor the use of natural resources.” The proposal, she says, is a very large bet on “ambition and very little on real mitigation.”

Negotiations in Belém, during the 30th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30), progressed on the issue of offsetting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions between countries. While other fronts, such as climate finance and the phase-out of fossil fuels, remain stalled, the debate surrounding Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which deals with the regulation of the carbon market, has progressed relatively smoothly.

The mechanism provided for in Article 6 allows countries with a “positive carbon balance” to trade credits with those that emit the most, so that everyone can meet their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) targets, submitted to the United Nations (UN) for mitigating greenhouse gases. In practice, this means allowing nations to offset part of their emissions by buying from countries that have actually managed to reduce their own carbon emissions. It is in this context — between promises of climate ambition and the consolidation of a new global market for offsets — that scientist Marcela Vecchione, from the Center for Advanced Amazonian Studies (UFPA), sees Article 6 more as a “reset of capitalism” than as an effective instrument for tackling the climate crisis.

“It has increasingly shown itself to be a compensation mechanism, not a mitigation one,” she stated in an interview with InfoAmazonia. “This does not change the means of production as we expect. In the end, it does not transform the productive system, whether it is energy, agri-food or the use of natural resources. You don’t bring about transformation, but rather compensation.”

There is still no consensus on the methodologies for measuring offsets, especially with regard to integrity, which deals with the quality and environmental transparency of carbon credits, and additionality, which ensures that the reduction in emissions would not occur anyway (without the project) — concepts that seek to guarantee that the reduction in emissions is real. Discussions about these criteria are mainly led by European nations, which seek to avoid the risk of the mechanism falling into the same disrepute that plagues the voluntary carbon market, marked by double counting, land conflicts, low transparency, and questionable methodologies.

With expectations dashed regarding climate finance, the trading of credits is being touted as a new way to finance environmental actions in developing countries. In this model, rich countries, historically the largest emitters, could invest in projects in the Global South and, in return, use the resulting credits in their own NDCs.

Vecchione cites the example of the Tropical Forests Forever Fund (TFFF), a fund that has already raised billions of dollars to compensate countries that preserve forests. According to her, there is strong evidence that the mechanism will be classified as eligible to generate so-called ITMOs, an acronym for Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes, which can be converted into carbon credits.

Read the complete interview below:

InfoAmazonia – Article 6 is often presented as the great engine of ‘climate ambition’. What does ‘ambition’ mean in this context?
Marcela Vecchione Gonçalves – “Ambition” here is very much linked to market mechanisms. Even when talking about non-market actions, the logic of compensation prevails. And compensation does not transform the productive system — neither the energy system, nor the agri-food system, nor the use of natural resources. It is a very large bet on “ambition” and very little on real mitigation.

So Article 6 doesn’t reduce emissions?
It has increasingly shown itself to be a compensation mechanism, and this is openly stated in the negotiations. The compensation logic is assumed, not hidden. There is no structural transformation, there is compensation between countries.

How do ITMOs work in practice?
ITMOs arise when a country transfers resources or makes a climate investment in another country. For example: Germany announced funding of 104 million euros to support the indigenous environmental and territorial management policy in Brazil. If this investment results in carbon storage or another mitigation effect, an ITMO is generated for Germany, which can use it to meet its NDC. The way this will be deducted from the Brazilian balance is still being defined, and this is precisely one of the main methodological disputes.

How do these mechanisms relate to human rights and inequalities?
Article 2 is the backbone of the Paris Agreement: it defines temperature levels and implementation mechanisms, but also affirms that the agreement is about human rights and combating inequalities. He points out that climate impacts do not affect everyone equally and that existing inequalities are exacerbated. Article 6 should operate within this framework, but many countries use it to evade obligations under Article 9 (public financing), replacing duties with market mechanisms.

Where does the dispute over financing come in?
Northern countries do not want to transfer public financing or unpatented technology. They only want to pay if they can gain something in return, such as registering the transfer under Article 6.4 [which establishes an international carbon credit mechanism] and accounting for it as their own mitigation. This is why Article 9 makes so little progress: there is an attempt to replace this public duty with tradable credit.

How does the Just Transition discussion relate to this scenario?
The Just Transition cuts across all articles of the Paris Agreement: financing, technology, emissions, inequalities, poverty. That is why the text is so contested. It exposes the contradiction: talking about a just transition while betting on a compensation system that maintains the same economic model.
The Belém Action Mechanism [advocated by civil society to ensure a coordinated just transition, with access to technologies and resources for the most vulnerable countries], which should be one of the main outcomes of COP30, seeks precisely to link social and economic justice to the structure of the agreement. But negotiations are stalled, full of loopholes and disagreements.

You mentioned hypocrisy from some countries in the negotiations. How does this manifest itself?
The hypocrisy lies in public positions and in practice. France and Germany, for example, sign letters calling for more ‘ambition’ while blocking fundamental negotiations, including on the accountability of their own extractive corporations operating in African countries. It’s a double-talk game.

In short, what is the central risk of Article 6?
That it reinforces an international system in which mitigation is accounted for, not carried out. A system in which countries continue to emit, but “mitigate” by buying results from others. It’s a celebration of the same. A reset of capitalism, not a climate transition.

This report was produced by InfoAmazonia, through the Collaborative Socio-environmental Coverage of COP 30. Read the original report at https://infoamazonia.org/2025/11/21/um-reset-do-capitalismo-nao-uma-transicao-climatica-alerta-cientista-marcela-vecchione-sobre-o-mercado-de-carbono-na-cop30/